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 A PARTICULAR PLACE? 
Laos and its incorporation into the development mainstream 
 
Abstract 
Laos is a poor country in the world’s most economically vibrant region. The paper provides a 
historically embedded interpretation of Laos’ contemporary economic geography through 
three lenses: dualism, spatiality and scale. The paper proposes that while the patterns of 
change in the country are familiar, the meaning of those patterns is linked to a series of spatial 
associations, scalar disjunctures, historical contingencies, and cultural incongruities which are 
place-based and country or region specific. The paper draws a distinction between national 
and trans-national governmentalities on the one hand, and ‘village governmentalities’ on the 
other, offering these as alternative, but not mutually exclusive, ways of viewing and 
interpreting Laos’ economic geography.   
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Laos: a particular place? 
 
Until comparatively recently, Laos was a blank page and a black box – the invisible country 
of the Southeast Asian region. At a time when other countries of Southeast Asia were 
elbowing their way into the mainstream of development and into the mindsets of scholars and 
policy makers, Laos was in danger of simply sinking from view. Most economic studies of 
the Southeast Asian region, for example, either ignored Laos entirely or, having noted that the 
country was a geographical component of the region, were either unable or unwilling to say 
much more. This state of affairs, in which Laos languished as the ‘forgotten’ country of 
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Southeast Asia, essentially extended from the beginning of the development era in the 1960s, 
through to the early 1990s. 
 
The reasons why Laos was in danger of slipping off the page were, essentially, a combination 
of the country’s international insignificance; the isolationist policies pursued by the Lao 
People’s Revolutionary Party until the late 1980s; the response of the international 
community to the victory of the communist Pathet Lao in 1975; the belief in some quarters 
that Laos was not a country at all but a cartographic accident; and the difficulties and dangers 
of undertaking research in a country that was embroiled in a war for long years and around 
which travel was difficult and often impossible. 
 
The first grounded study of Lao rural society to be published since 1975 was Grant Evans’ 
Lao peasants under socialism (1990; and see Evans, 1995). Even he, however, could only 
undertake research in villages close to the capital, Vientiane. For nearly two decades then, 
from the early 1970s to the early 1990s, at a time when other countries in the Southeast Asian 
region were being intensively researched and scrutinised, knowledge of Laos was actually 
diminishing as studies and data aged. Many of the country’s small educated elite, furthermore, 
fled to Thailand following the victory of the Pathet Lao, leaving the country with a woefully 
thin base of educated women and men. A report prepared by the Lao government in 1989 for 
a Least Developed Countries round table meeting in Geneva had to admit that even the GDP 
estimates for the country were “only approximate” (GoL, 1989, page 10) and this lack of 
knowledge extended to many other of the country’s “key physical, social, economic and 
climatic variables” (UNDP, 1990). Even government offices in Vientiane are said to “rely 
more on guesswork than real data” (Vatthana Pholsena and Banomyong, 2006, page 74). 
While there is a surprisingly substantial literature on Laos – a recent bibliography, for 
example, extends to 1,385 pages (Gay et al, 2003) – compared with other countries of the 
region the knowledge base on which a contemporary economic geography can be built, is 
limited. 
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 Making Laos special? Policy, global integration and regional differentiation 
 
Laos (Figure 1) is a transitional economy. This is the title page and the leitmotif of the 
country’s development project. Since the early 1980s, Laos has progressively been venturing 
further into the economic and political mainstream. Economically this is encapsulated in the 
reforms of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), more evocatively termed Chin Thanakaan 
Mai, or ‘New Thinking’, which comprise, in summary (Rigg, 2005): 
 
• A move to a market determination of prices and resource allocation 
• A shift from central planning to guidance planning 
• An elimination of subsidies and introduction of monetary controls 
• An alignment of the domestic currency with the market rate 
• A decentralisation of control to industries and lower levels of government 
• The encouragement of the private sector 
• The encouragement of foreign investment 
 
The policies of the NEM can be neatly mapped onto the generic Washington consensus 
(Table 1; and see Rigg, 2005, page 23) and the capital, Vientiane, is dotted with the offices of 
the multilateral agencies and agents of these institutions are intimately involved in the 
formulation of the country’s development policies. We see in Laos, therefore – or at least at 
first glance – an incorporation of one of the world’s poorest countries into a policy milieu 
which has as its intellectual and political heart an ideology of development that is Western in 
both its geography (it comes from the West) and in its intellectual provenance (it is of the 
West). It seems, on this basis, that the term ‘Eurocentric’, can be applied in spades to Laos’ 
recent development. Side-by-side with this process of economic mainstreaming, at a regional 
level we see the incorporation, politically, of Laos into the Association of Southeast Asian 
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Nations (Asean), which the country joined in 1997. The habit of attending Asean meetings 
and contact and communication between officials at high and mid-levels has served to ingrain 
a sense of regional identity and common purpose. Taken together, and it would seem that the 
economic will of the NEM/Washington consensus and the political exigencies of belonging to 
Asean have drawn Laos inexorably into the mainstream. The policies of economic 
development in Laos are formed and formulated on the basis of a global intellectual current 
centred on Washington, tempered by a regional political framework informed by the Asean 
‘way’. 
 
But the development story in Laos is not a simple one of submission to global economic 
strictures and forces, and regional political incorporation. There are two other stories to 
tell that serve to unsettle this neat picture of global and regional integration. First, there is 
a story of Lao exceptionalism and a concerted effort to maintain the distinctiveness of 
Laos in the wider regional and global context. And second, there is a local narrative of 
incorporation and inclusion which rubs up against the higher level debates and visions. To 
understand the first, it is necessary to excavate quite deeply into the country’s pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial pasts (See: Stuart-Fox, 1993, 1996, and 2006; Jerndal 
and Rigg, 1998; Vatthana Pholsena and Lockhart, 2006; and Lockhart, 2006). And to 
appreciate the second – and this comes later in the paper – it is necessary to ask what 
happens to policies and pronouncements as they enter local spaces and make the 
transition from rhetoric to policy, from policy to practice, and from practice to experience. 
 
A Lao historiography 
 
At the real risk of collapsing and simplifying Lao history, prior to the late 19th century the 
area that we now call ‘Laos’ was a site of tussle and conflict between competing regional 
powers and, in particular, Siam (Thailand) and Vietnam. There were, to be sure, powers and 
principalities that arose in the lands of Laos and which had some influence but to say that 
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‘Laos’ existed prior to the 20th century would be to stretch a point. The French colonisation of 
the lands of present-day Laos – more by accident than design – did little to change this state 
of affairs and forge a sense of Lao identity. The French treated Laos as the resource-rich 
annex to their more important possessions over the Annamite mountains, in Vietnam. In fact, 
they had plans, which came to nought, to subsume Laos within a Greater Vietnam. During the 
Second World War, the government of Siam, in their attempts to achieve their objective of 
creating a Greater Thailand based on a pan-Thai nationalist agenda, annexed two portions of 
Lao territory in 1941 (Ivarsson et al, 1995, page 13). In response to the threat from the west, 
from 1941 the French Vichy government in Hanoi began to engender a sense of Lao national 
identity, marking the “first serious attempt to create an unprecedented national space in Laos 
and….a modernist nationalist discourse on Laos and the Lao” (Ivarsson, 1999, page 76). 
Having survived the Second World War without being absorbed by Siam or integrated into 
Vietnam, and then having achieved independence from France in 1954, the country was 
divided by a civil war for more than two decades. A US-backed Royalist government based in 
Vientiane controlled the lowlands of the Mekong valley, while the Hanoi-supported Pathet 
Lao operated across much of the rest of the country. Only in 1975 was Laos finally reunified 
under a communist government, with the full and final victory of the Pathet Lao. 
 
With this history in mind, it is scarcely surprising that one of the themes of Lao government 
policy since 1975 has been to cement in the population’s minds and in the regional context 
the notion that Laos exists and, moreover, has done so for many centuries. The official, 1,300-
page Pravatsat Lao or History of Laos published in 2000 (see Lockhart, 2006) provides a 
historical narrative that transcends ethnic difference, and links the present with a 
(reconstructed) past. As Lockhart says, this official history has “no shortage of artificial or 
even fictional elements that stretch historical credibility to breaking point” (2006, page 377). 
It also, though, provides a ‘counter-discourse’ to the view that has sometimes emanated from 
Thailand, promulgated by Thai historians, that there is a pan-Thai (or pan-Tai) civilisation 
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that reaches north and east into Laos and China (Vatthana Pholsena and Lockhart, 2006, page 
335; and see Vatthana Pholsena, 2006). 
 
So, we can see in Lao government/party policy a concerted attempt to ‘create’ Laos, for two 
sets of constituents; for the Lao people themselves (i.e. for those within), and for the 
international community (i.e. for those without). Over the last three decades, Laos has 
acquired a history and the peoples of Laos have acquired at least the pretence of a common 
bond that links them to each other rather than to groups residing in neighbouring countries. 
However in papering over Laos’ multi-ethnic past and in denying the country’s ethnic 
minorities a history that can be told separately from that of the country as a whole, ructions 
have been created (see Lockhart, 2006).  
 
From neat histories to messy presents: three approaches to discerning economic 
geographies of Laos 
 
This introduction has, so far, been Laos-centric. But the paper is not only intended to add to 
our rather meagre knowledge of Laos. I also wish to use the country as a stage on which to 
rehearse, and reflect on, discussions of ‘trans-national governmentalities’ and ‘village 
governmentalities’. The first of these is exemplified in the work of Ferguson (2005) and 
Ferguson and Gupta (2002) and, in writing of trans-national governmentalities, they are 
referring to “…not only new strategies of discipline and regulation, exemplified by the WTO 
and the structural adjustment programs implemented by the IMF, but also transnational 
alliances forged by activists and grassroots organizations and the proliferation of voluntary 
organizations supported by complex networks of international and transnational funding and 
personnel” (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002, page 990). The notion of village governmentalities, 
meanwhile, picks up on discussions over village transnationalism and highlights the way in 
which people – individuals and households – often separated across space, are deeply 
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connected. While trans-national governmentality focuses on the transnational network, village 
governmentality focuses on the nodal points, viewing these as containers of human agency.  
 
Returning to the discussion of Laos, three entry points are provided for an examination of 
Laos’ economic geography. First of all, it is possible to focus on the dualisms in Lao society, 
of which the most pertinent in the context of this discussion are between the Lao, as an ethnic 
group, and the various non-Lao minorities; and between Laos and Thailand. The second entry 
point focuses on patterns of economic activity in the country – in other words, on Laos’ 
economic geography, in the classical sense. The third entry point engages with the distinction 
between policy and practice/experience, or between economic geographies seen from the 
perspective of the village and the rice field, and economic geographies viewed from Vientiane, 
through the lens of planning documents and government pronouncements. 
 
Clearly, another set of entry points could have been selected – there are many ways to cut the 
Laotian cake: evolving relations with China, the political economy of resource plunder, and 
environmental degradation, for instance. Those selected here, though, are seen to touch on 
key issues that both resonate with the Lao experience and relate to wider geographical debates. 
Moreover, it is through considering such wider concerns that it becomes evident that the entry 
points are not isolated one from the other, but linked. In particular, they cut through two 
debates: that over space, place and scale; and, second, the debate over society and economy 
(see Jonas, 2006; Mansfield, 2005; Marston et al, 2005). In this way, the entry points can be 
seen operating in the context of several competing, though not mutually exclusive, scalar 
discourses: 
 
• A global discourse of economic reform and market integration which has Laos 
entering and becoming part of the mainstream 
• A regional discourse of Laos as a component part of a wider Southeast Asian region, 
where an Asian identity creates and cements a common purpose 
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• A national discourse of Lao exceptionalism, which separates the country from its key 
neighbour, Thailand, and which has its roots in centuries of interaction, contact and 
conflict 
• And a sub-national, centre/periphery discourse which highlights the differences 
between the centre – the capital, Vientiane – and local spaces 
 
Entry point #1: Lao dualisms 
 
What are the pertinent dualisms in Laos today? The obvious framing would be in terms of 
modern/traditional, lowland/upland and, possibly, global/national. I wish to suggest that a 
more instructive pair of dualisms – and by instructive, I mean illuminating – is between 
Laos/Thailand and Lao/non-Lao. As will become clear, both these dualism touch in important 
ways on the historiography rehearsed above. History informs economic geography; economic 
policy reflects certain historical antecedents; and these policies, in turn, serve to re-shape 
contemporary economic geographies. 
 
In the Thai capital, Bangkok, there remains a tendency to Thai-ify Laos: to see the country as 
a cultural and historical component of Greater Thailand. Unlike the usual debate over 
difference in the mainstream literature, which emphasises the East-West dichotomy, in Laos 
concern revolves around relations with Thailand. This, ironically, is not because of the latent 
differences between Laos and Thailand, but because of the two countries’ similarities. 
Thailand and Laos’ histories, or the histories of those spaces that we now call Thailand and 
Laos, have intersected at key junctures over the centuries and their peoples share a language, 
religion and many other social and cultural commonalities.1 Thailand is also, however, the 
regional super-power so this relationship is not one of equals. Thailand is Laos’ greatest 
                                                 
1 This is a simplification because Thailand and Laos, the latter particularly, are far from being 
homogeneous countries themselves. Nonetheless, the broad point is germane. 
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investor, largest trading partner, hundreds of thousands of Lao nationals work in Thailand, 
and the baht is used as currency in day-to-day financial transactions, along with the US$ and 
the Lao kip.2 Thailand’s presence in Laos ranges from these tangible elements that we can 
measure and track – money, labour, commodities, and so forth – to the more intangible. Grant 
Evans (1998, pages 108-113), for example, notes how Thai royalty support development 
projects in Laos in much the same way that they do in Thailand and how pictures of the Thai 
royal family or calendars with images of Thai royalty adorn people’s houses and shops. It is 
as if, Grant says, “the Thai king had become a proxy for Lao royalty” (1998, page 113). In 
everyday contact, Thai and Lao reveal a level of engagement which reaches beyond normal 
communication between neighbours: “When someone from Thailand meets a Lao, he almost 
instinctively refers to himself as elder brother (phii) in the same way that a Bangkok citizen 
would do when meeting someone from Thailand’s own periphery” (Ivarsson et al, 1995, 
pages 24-5). The implication would seem to be that many Thai – often without realising – 
regard the Lao of Laos as they do the Lao of the Northeastern region of Thailand.  
 
Inevitably, the Lao government is highly sensitive to any insinuation that Laos is ‘part’ of 
Thailand, or to anything that smacks of condescension on the part of the Thai. In his Masters 
thesis completed at the University of Sydney, the long-serving (1998-2006) Lao ambassador 
to Thailand, Hiem Phommachanh, wrote: “For decades, the Thais acted as superiors (elder 
brothers) over the Lao people and attempted to despise the Lao age-old cultural identity”. 
This view is not surprising when one considers that a former Thai premier, Kukrit Pramoj, is 
reputed to have once said that “living with Laos is like raising a pet gibbon” (quoted in Khien 
Theeravit and Adisorn Semyaem, 2002, page 57). Thongchai Winichakul’s (2005) review of 
Thai scholarship on Southeast Asia notes how it has tended to be ‘ego-centric’ in orientation, 
                                                 
2 In 2004 the Thai Ministry of Interior estimated that there were 181,614 registered migrants from Laos 
working in Thailand, 80,981 men and 100,633 women (Maniemai Thongyou and Dusadee Ayuwat, 
2005, page 3). There are also many unregistered migrant workers. Some NGOs estimate that there are 
300,000 Lao working in Thailand (Huijsmans, 2007, page 20). 
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viewing the country’s neighbours either as dependencies or as enemies. Nor does Thongchai 
think much has changed: “Laos is still the pitiful sibling of earlier days…tied to and 
dependent on Thailand” (Thongchai Winichakul, 2005, page 123). A good portion of Lao 
government policy is designed to ‘protect’ the Lao population from what are seen to be the 
corrosive influences of Big Brother across the Mekong. 
 
A Thai-funded study of Lao perceptions of Thailand undertaken in 2001 revealed that 14 out 
of 39 national leaders sampled – more than one third – viewed Thailand as ‘more a foe than a 
friend’.3 It is not just a case of cultural sensitivities linked to a prevailing sense of Thai 
superiority. It is also necessary to recognise that security concerns play an important role in 
moulding Lao-Thai relations. Historically, Thailand has harboured territorial ambitions in 
Laos. During the war between the Pathet Lao and Royal Lao government, Thailand hosted US 
bases from where military aircraft were dispatched in support of the RLG’s efforts; after 1975, 
refugee camps in Thailand housed thousands of displaced Lao, many of them vehemently 
opposed to the new government in Vientiane; and there was a small but vicious border battle 
in 1987-1988 between the two countries over disputed territory in Ban Romklao-Boten, 
straddling Thailand’s Phitsanulok province and Xayabouri in Laos (Figure 1). It is this that 
explains why all but one of the 39 Lao national leaders interviewed in the survey noted above 
stated that Thailand was a threat to Lao national security in the past and, moreover, that 30 
continued to believe this to be the case (Khien Theeravit and Adisorn Semyaem, 2002, page 
81). 
 
The sensitivities that inform Lao-Thai relations can be seen reflected in small ways, as well as 
large. Take, for example, how the Lao government has dealt with the thorny issue of 
‘poverty’. Poverty – officially – did not exist in Laos until relatively recently, on first sight an 
                                                 
3 The same study revealed that 28 out of the 39 Lao national leaders felt that – among a selection of 
nations – it was the Thai people who were most likely to look down upon the Lao. 
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odd state of affairs in one of the world’s poorest countries.4 It was only in 2001 that a 
definition of poverty was adopted by the government, and an officially accepted Lao term for 
poverty was embraced a year after this, in 2002.5 The official term for poverty in Laos is thuk 
nyak (suffering + difficult) (Chamberlain and Phanh Phomsombath, 2002, page 62). Thuk is 
the Buddhist term for suffering and, as Chamberlain and Phanh Phomsombath say, is closer to 
mental than to physical suffering. Significantly, the Lao authorities decided to pair thuk with 
nyak and in so doing avoided using the most likely alternative pairing, thuk + chon. Chon, or 
yaak chon, is the popular Thai word for poverty and is closer to meaning ‘destitute’ than the 
less extreme and grinding ‘difficult’. At one level we can interpret this choice of words as an 
attempt to separate the production of poverty in Laos from the operation of the market, 
making poverty a ‘natural’ state of affairs connected with Buddhist metaphysics rather than 
government policy. What it also does, however, is separate poverty in Laos from poverty in 
Thailand, emphasising the fact that Laos is different. 
 
The second key dualism is between the lowland Lao and the country’s minorities. 
Understanding why this is so central to debates on Laos it is necessary to return to the 
discussion above about the creation of Meuang Lao – the country of Laos. In forging Laos, 
the government in Vientiane has been presented with two particular challenges: first, there are 
many more ethnic Lao living in Thailand than living in Laos; and second, a large proportion 
                                                 
4 The first Lao Expenditure and Consumption Survey (LECS) was undertaken in 1992-1993 (GoL, 
1995). While there is discussion of poverty in this survey it is related to international standards and the 
international literature. As there was no official poverty line at the time, the survey skirts the question 
of poverty in Laos. Instead the survey talks about ‘low standards of living’.  
 
5 Poverty is “the lack of essential needs of daily lives such as the lack of foods (possession of foods that 
are less than 2,100 calories/head/day), the lack of clothing, the non-possession of permanent 
accommodations, unaffordable fees of medical treatments in case of illness, unaffordable payments for 
self-education as well as that of members of the family and unavailable conditions for convenient 
communications” (quoted in UNDP, 2001, page 129). (Note: this is an informal translation by the 
UNDP office in Vientiane.) 
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of the population of Laos are not Lao at all, but belong to one of several score minority 
groups. How is it possible to create a history for all the peoples of Laos, and not just the 
lowland-dwelling, Theravada Buddhism-practising, wet rice-growing, Lao? One approach 
was to re-designate all Laos’ various peoples as ‘Lao’, but of different varieties. Most official 
reports and many academic papers still refer to three broad categories of Lao, the Lao Loum, 
Lao Theung and Lao Soung or, in turn, the Lowland, Midland and Highland (or Upland) Lao. 
Vatthana Pholsena refers to these as ‘seminal terms’ (2002, page 180). 
 
The Lao Loum are the dominant lowland-dwelling ‘Lao’ who make up between one half and 
two-thirds of the population (sources disagree). The Lao Theung map on to the ‘Kha’,6 while 
the Lao Soung are the colonial era demarcated ‘Meo-Yao’. For Vatthana Pholsena, during the 
course of the colonial period and the early years of independence, a “truth had been produced 
and legitimised, naturalised through a series of discourses, which were operated, integrated 
and transmitted by…colonial administration, the post-colonial state, scholars and the 
population…” (2002, page 180; and see Jamaree Chiengthong, 2003). The attraction of this 
formulation from the perspective of the Lao PDR was that all the population of Laos, no 
matter what their ethnic origins, was ‘Lao’. It was driven by a desire to make the geographical 
space of Laos, coincident with Lao national space. While this classification may have been 
officially dropped in 1985 (possibly in 1981) under the orders of the General Secretary of the 
LPRP, General Kaysone Phomvihane, it lives on in reports and documents emanating not 
only from multilateral agencies but even from government ministries (see Rigg, 2005, page 
30 [fn 15]; Vatthana Pholsena, 2006, page 158). It also has a degree of popular legitimacy and 
is invoked, on the ground, by officials and local leaders.  
 
                                                 
6 It has been usual to translate ‘Kha’ as meaning ‘slave’ and therefore to ascribe to it derogatory 
overtones. However Chamberlain and Panh Phomsombath argue that the Tai-Kha/civilised-uncivilised 
relationship has been overplayed and that the term Kha has been imbued with more negative meaning 
that it deserves (2002, page 41). 
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Notwithstanding this effort at nation-building, the key social and economic divisions between 
the lowland Lao and the minorities remain. The minorities, on all measures, are socially and 
economically excluded. They are poorer, die younger, suffer higher level of morbidity and 
lower levels of nutrition, have lower levels of education, are remote from services and 
infrastructure, and are less likely to occupy positions of authority. The ADB-sponsored 
participatory poverty analysis (PPA) unequivocally states: “…poverty in the Lao PDR is 
inextricably related to culture and ethnicity and…its focus is with highlanders” (ADB, 2001a, 
page 25) (Table 2). Income/consumption inequalities are mirrored in the health and 
educational profiles of different ethnic groups. One of the largest systematic studies of 
poverty and ethnicity in Laos was undertaken by the EU in 1996. This surveyed 6,000 
households across 342 villages in four districts in Luang Prabang province (EU, 1997) and 
identified “the emergence of a social discriminatory process leaving behind the weaker part of 
the rural society…which appears to be Lao Theung [i.e. minority] in origin” (1997, page iv). 
The national discourse is one of equality between peoples in a multi-ethnic state; the reality, 
however, is one of deep-seated and continuing, possibly even deepening, inequality. 
 
The minority/non-minority dualism is, geographically, an upland/lowland one, reflected in the 
collapsing of the Lao population into three agro-ecological categories linked to where they 
live: in the lowlands (loum), midlands (theung), or uplands (soung). It is also a dualism that 
feeds into other significant divides: between connected and remote, between market 
(commercial) and subsistence (self-reliant), and between shifting and sedentary. In this paper, 
however, the argument is that it is the non-minority/minority dualism with which we should 
begin, because it is this dualism which is the most powerful in explaining patterns of 
economic differentiation and social exclusion in the country. This is illustrated in a second 
and less well publicised PPA, also commissioned by the ADB, on patterns of urban poverty in 
Vientiane. The study reveals that many of the very poorest (tuk thii sut) in the capital belong 
to one of the country’s ethnic minorities and a dominant finding is that vulnerability is an 
outcome of social exclusion and marginalisation from key socio-economic structures (ADB, 
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2001b: 17 and 36). In other words, the factors that make the ethnic minorities poor in upland 
and rural areas would seem to be reproduced in lowland areas and urban centres. 
 
There are radically competing explanations for this all-too-clear pattern of poverty in Laos. 
These reflect different ideological positions, which then inform policy and, in turn, have the 
potential to alter economic geographies. These links between problem identification, 
explanation, policy-making, and economic geographies will be addressed in the next section 
of the paper. Suffice to say that the Lao state – and many of the multilateral agencies in 
Vientiane – have characterised the condition of the upland peoples as a product and an 
outcome of their adherence to traditional modes of living and, more particularly, shifting 
cultivation in the uplands. Government policy is predicated on the assumption that their 
socio-economic condition will be improved through their incorporation into the mainstream 
and through their embracing of settled agriculture. For some scholars, however, the poverty of 
the upland people is a product of their engagement with the state and the market on 
unfavourable terms (see Rigg, 2005; Chamberlain and Panh Phomsombath, 2002; ADB, 
2001a). In other words, poverty is produced – rather than ameliorated – through 
modernisation and state incorporation. 
 
Entry point #2: spatialities of economic activity – area based development and the GMS 
 
The obvious spatial division and distinction – and this picks up on a long geographical 
tradition – is between upland and lowland peoples and livelihoods. While there has always 
been more contact and communication between upland and lowland peoples in Laos than 
often assumed, and notwithstanding the continuing efforts of the Lao government to draw 
upland areas into the mainstream, the distinction remains germane. However the spatialities 
of economic activity are being altered by two forces which have rather different, and 
sometimes contradictory or competing outcomes. These forces arise from the operation of 
government policies on the one hand, and regional market integration on the other. 
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 The Lao government’s rural development policy is area-based and focuses on concentrating 
resources and services in particular areas, bringing the people to these development centres, 
rather than vice versa (Figure 2). This strategy has been highly contentious and the generally 
accepted view today is that it has, in more than a few instances, undermined livelihoods, 
extracted upland peoples from their traditional lands, led to severe social disruption and, in 
the process, created poverty.7 The executive summary of one report opens with the following: 
 
“There now exists a compelling and growing volume of evidence demonstrating that 
internal resettlement and related initiatives in Laos are, in many cases, having a major and 
generally negative impact on the social systems, livelihoods and cultures of many 
indigenous ethnic communities and people. Tens of thousands of vulnerable indigenous 
ethnic minority people have suffered and died due to impacts associated with ill-
conceived and poorly implemented internal resettlement initiatives in Laos over the last 
ten years. Many of those impacted can expect to be impoverished long into the future” 
(Baird and Shoemaker, 2005, page 2). 
 
Besides the implications of these policies for human well-being, area-based development has 
also had a profound effect on economic geographies in the uplands through concentrating 
populations in particular sites (close to roads), barring access to traditional shifting cultivation 
fields, encouraging permanent field agriculture and, in particular, wet rice cultivation, and 
capturing the forested spaces and their value for the state and its associates. This policy is 
partly informed by the country’s nation-building creed, partly by the market-integration 
philosophy of the major donors, and partly by deep-held normative views in Vientiane about 
                                                 
7 The intention in this paper is not to provide a detailed dissection of the Focal Site Strategy and the 
linked Land-Forest Allocation programme. Both, however, are area-based development strategies. For 
further discussion see: Rigg, 2005; Baird and Shoemaker, 2005; Baird and Shoemaker, 2007; 
Ducourtieux et al, 2005; Evrard and Goudineau, 2004; Thapa, 1998; and Vandergeest, 2003. 
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how people should lead their lives. Regarding the second of these, the World Bank holds that 
“…remoteness is an important cause of rural poverty…” (World Bank, 1999, page 7) while 
the UNDP also offers the view that “lack of access causes poverty” (UNDP, 1996a, page 3). 
With such unequivocal views, it is no surprise that the largest slice of public investment over 
the last two decades should have been directed at infrastructure provision, and most of this to 
road construction. 
 
For the Lao leadership in Vientiane there is the additional perception that shifting cultivation 
is not only environmentally destructive, but also inherently primitive. Ethnic chauvinism, in 
part inherited from the colonial and pre-revolutionary independence periods and in part a 
product of Marxist-Leninist evolutionary views of cultural development, inform the beliefs 
and actions of politicians and policy makers. The chairman of the National Rural 
Development Committee once described rural areas in Laos as “…areas which are isolated, 
remote and uncivilized, in which the ways of living of people are different from others, and in 
which there are high natural and political risks” and where rural people are “poor and 
backward, and unhappy when they lack food and medicines” (UNDP, 1996b, page 14). What 
we can see, in other words, is that a set of views held by key leaders and policy-makers in 
Vientiane being translated into particular policies and these, in turn, having a profound impact 
on patterns of activity across large areas of the country. It should be emphasised that 
resettlement and area-based development is not a bagatelle policy; it has led to “a dramatic 
deconstruction and restructuring of upland Lao societies over very short periods…‘internal 
resettlement is the biggest thing happening in upland areas of Laos at the present time’” 
(Baird and Shoemaker, 2005, page 6). 
 
In many respects, the Land-forest allocation programme (LFAP) is a model of aware and 
locally-sensitive development intervention and ‘ticks the boxes’ of current best practice in 
rural development. It involves negotiation between the implementing agencies and local 
people, takes into account local needs and views, provides villagers with collective rights to 
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resources, and is highly participatory (Vandergeest, 2003, pages 49-51). These good 
intentions come unstuck because of two core sets of assumptions that inform the policy and 
which over-ride the participatory flannel. First about how people should be living their lives – 
namely, as settled agriculturalists rather than as shifting cultivators; and second, about how 
land and space should be organised (see Vandergeest, 2003). With regard to the latter, the 
LFAP has led to the bureaucratisation of land and space in a context where, traditionally, 
these were managed in a flexible manner. The programme, therefore, gathers together a 
number of inherently conflicting and contradictory frames. To begin with, the programme 
pays homage to the international farmer-first + local knowledge + participatory development 
paradigm. Second, it implicitly reflects a set of deeply ingrained local beliefs held by many of 
the educated elite as well as ‘ordinary’ lowlanders about upland peoples and life styles.8 And 
third, it links into a set of technical and managerial guidelines regarding the measurement, 
classification and categorisation of people and space. 
 
The second force changing patterns of economic activity in Laos is linked to regional market 
integration. This process is not confined to the lowlands, although it is in the lowlands where 
its effects are most marked. (As against government policies which have the most marked 
effects in the uplands.) Essentially, a regional human resource economy is emerging where 
the provinces of Laos lining the Mekong are becoming tied to, and dependent upon, labouring 
opportunities in Thailand. This is creating labour shortages in some areas of Laos while also 
leading to a significant flow of income from Thailand to Laos (see Rigg, 2007). So called 
‘remittance landscapes’ (McKay, 2003 and 2005) are being created where the multiple 
geographies of household, home, village and field are becoming implicated into networks of 
links and associations tying these Lao places and lives to non-Lao places and lives. 
                                                 
8 These are also characteristic of ‘lowland’ and elite views in Thailand and Vietnam. As Rambo et al. 
say in the introduction to a collection of papers on highland development in Vietnam, the “view of 
minority cultures as backward was manifested in presentations by many of the Vietnamese participants 
[in the conference]” (1995, page xx). 
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Connectivity, in other words does not just link people and places; it reworks those people and 
places. 
 
Beyond a regional human resource economy, there is an intensifying regional market in goods. 
China to the north, Vietnam to the East, and Thailand to the west are all exerting their 
influence with manufactured goods streaming in to Laos, and agricultural products (and 
labour) filtering out. While this process of market integration is less clearly and tightly linked 
to policy interventions than the resettlement and area-based development discussed above, 
there is an evident political/policy context. Politically, rapprochement between Laos and 
Thailand has oiled trans-border links. In policy terms, the vision of forging closer associations 
between the countries of the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) (Figure 1) for mutual benefit 
is setting in place a physical infrastructure that will create an economic geography of activity 
and interaction founded on an economic logic that is couched at the regional rather than the 
national level: 
 
“When, as in Cambodia and Laos, these [rural-urban] linkages are underdeveloped or do 
not exist, farmers have no easy access to markets for produce or for inputs, and they 
neither have the incentives nor get the market signals needed for making the shift to more 
specialized production. At the same time, rural non-farm and off-farm activities remain 
confined to small local markets that do not allow economies of scale and specialisation or, 
if they have some access to larger markets, are at the mercy of intermediaries who take 
advantage of their position to charge monopoly rents that do away with the possibility and 
the incentive to invest. The consequence, in both cases, is stagnation” (ADB, 2005, page 
74) 
 
The GMS project was launched in 1992 with the encouragement and support of the ADB and 
given further impetus in November 2001 when the Strategic Framework for the Greater 
Mekong Sub-region was adopted at the Asean Ministerial Conference (see 
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http://www.adb.org/GMS/Program/default.asp). It had become, by the turn of the Millennium, 
a pivotal project of both the ADB, which helps to fund its realisation, and Asean, which 
delivers its political rationale. At the first GMS Summit held in Phnom Penh at the end of 
November 2002, the leaders of the sub-region endorsed a ten-year strategic framework with 
five strategic thrusts: 
 
• Strengthen infrastructure linkages through a multi-sectoral approach  
• Facilitate cross-border trade and investment  
• Enhance private sector participation in development and improve its competitiveness  
• Develop human resources and skill competencies, and  
• Protect the environment and promote sustainable use of the sub-region’s shared 




Cornford (2006) addresses the impacts of the GMS’s East-West corridor (EWC) linking 
Thailand and Vietnam through southern Laos (Figure 1). He sees the EWC as a transnational 
highway which has, as its underpinning economic logic, the linking of northeast Thailand 
with the port of Danang in Vietnam. Along with the road itself, the GMS requires that 
national borders become more permeable so that people and commodities can flow freely 
between the countries of the sub-region. It seems highly likely that this initiative will 
progressively make Laos part of a larger economic unit, and people’s livelihoods will become 
implicated in wider, trans-national circuits of exchange. Of course they will not become 
equally involved however, and it has been suggested that established inequalities will be 
accentuated, particularly those that relate to ethnic divisions (Cornford, 2006, page 22). Not 
only do some scholars see the GMS initiative having negative economic effects on more 
vulnerable states and peoples, but these spill over and are reflected in negative environmental 
and social effects (see, for example, Hirsch, 2001; Oehlers, 2006). 
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 The key point in the context of this paper is not to argue the case for or against the GMS, but 
rather to note the way in which a regional initiative, founded on certain assumptions about the 
likely positive outcomes of supporting regional market integration, and greased by a process 
of political rapprochement between the states of mainland Southeast Asia, is forging a new 
economic geography in Laos. This is linked to a belief, to begin with, in the power of the 
market; second, in the notion that there are complementarities to be exploited between the 
GMS states; and third, in the central role of physical integration (or connectivity) in forging 
more productive spaces and partnerships. 
 
Entry point #3: Village economic geographies and Vientiane economic geographies 
 
The third and final entry point and binary is between what is termed here ‘Village economic 
geographies’ and ‘Vientiane economic geographies’. With regard to this third area of debate, I 
am guided by Tania Li’s work on policy formation in Indonesia and her desire to uncover not 
what policy is, but what policy does. She asks the question: ‘what do development 
interventions accomplish?’ (Li, 1999). Following Li, in this section I wish to foreground the 
disjuncture between economic geographies as seen and constructed in Vientiane and by elites 
at the centres of decision-making, and economic geographies as experienced and re-structured 
by ordinary people, on the ground. 
  
The role and effects of re-settlement policy in the uplands of Laos have already been 
discussed. While there are strong reasons to indicate that this broad policy has, in many 
instances, been inimical to the interests of upland peoples, there is some evidence of a process 
of ‘re-territorialisation from below’. People work with, around and below the policies that the 
state puts in place. Villagers, even in a one party state such as Laos, find ways to resist and 
subvert these policies. Viewed from the village, therefore, policy effects are – as Li found in 
the case of Indonesia – filtered through and shrouded by local political cultures. In the context 
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of my own work fieldwork in northern Laos and reflecting on the effects of government 
policies towards the upland minorities, I wrote: 
 
“…minorities become implicitly re-drawn as ‘victims’ of state policies and are left largely 
devoid of agency, autonomy or power. The reality is rather different. Minorities often 
leave their homes, abandon their lands, and rebuild their lives voluntarily – if not always 
willingly. Purpose is allayed with energy, direction with initiative, and intent with 
resolution. In this way there occurs a process of reterritorialisation from below, an 
unscripted and energizing transition that takes the resettled and displaced and transforms 
them, once more, into villagers, albeit ‘new’ villagers” (Rigg, 2005, pages 110-111) 
 
We can, therefore, read the script of development from two – in fact more than two – vantage 
points. The script as it might be read from Vientiane sets out an economic logic and 
justification based on a set of assumptions about the direction that development should take 
and the best means to alleviate poverty and improve standards of living in rural areas. This 
centre-script is, in turn, influenced by forces and debates beyond Laos – in the offices of the 
ADB and the World Bank, and in discussions held between ministers at Asean gatherings, for 
instance. The script read from the village context reveals what happens when these policies 
rub up against the people they are ostensibly designed to ‘help’. One particular aspect of this 




A process of village transnationalisation is underway in Laos driven by two forces. First of all, 
by the migration of large numbers of (mostly) young Lao to Thailand, mainly for work (see 
Rigg, 2007). These young women and men have their outlooks transformed in the process, 
and quite remote and poor rural communities in Laos become linked in a cultural and 
aspirational sense with Thailand, as well as economically through the remittance of relatively 
 22
large amounts of money. Village transnationalism is also being propelled, and second, by the 
infiltration of the Thai media into the homes and lives of ordinary Lao, displacing Lao media 
and instilling a Bangkok-centred world view. The villages of Laos, or at least those within 
around 50 kilometres of the border with Thailand, often know more about what is going on in 
their neighbour than they do about events in their own country. It has been suggested that in 
areas that can receive Thai transmission signals, 80 per cent consume Thai radio and 
television (Khien Theeravit and Adisorn Semyaem, 2002, page 17). Those living further away 
can also do so, using satellite dishes. 
 
In the process, villages in Laos are becoming oriented towards Thailand in social and 
economic terms. Pattana Kitiarsa (2006) has explored village transnationalism in the context 
of Thai-Isan migrants to Singapore, where migrants reproduce village life styles and habits in 
the city state – which Pattana Kitiarsa terms ‘transnationalism from below’ (page 32).9 
Migrants are excluded from mainstream Singapore society and, partly in defensive response, 
maintain an identity in mind and practice which is resolutely Thai. In the context of the 
discussion here, the notion of village transnationalism focuses on the way that labour 
migration to Thailand and contact between Lao and Thai lives and lifestyles infiltrates Lao 
village spaces. There are clear differences between Lao villagers migrating to Thailand for 
work, and Thai-Isan villagers migrating to Singapore, not least the cultural distance 
separating sending and receiving countries and populations. Nonetheless, the power of such 
links to explain changing economic geographies at home and in places of work is significant. 
It is also worth noting that the migration of villagers from the Northeast of Thailand to 
Singapore and elsewhere creates the labour vacuum that Lao migrants have partially filled. 
 
The intensifying contact – virtual and actual – between ordinary Lao and Thailand is viewed 
with some concern in Vientiane. The effects of the Thai media are seen to be corrosive of Lao 
                                                 
9 Thai-Isan migrants are from the Northeastern region of Thailand, and ethnically Lao. 
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culture, ‘poisonous’ to Lao society, ‘indoctrinating’, and promoting ‘informational 
imperialism’ (Khien Theeravit and Adisorn Semyaem, 2002). In February 2007 the Lao 
government requested that a Thai soap opera not be transmitted because, a Lao foreign 
ministry spokesman said, it was ‘against Lao culture’ as it depicted a love affair between a 
Lao woman, born out of wedlock, and a Thai man: “It’s against Lao culture to have a child 
without marriage…well, Thais might be okay with it but not for Laos” (Nation, 2007; see also 
Jory, 2003). To the Lao authorities, the Lao lead was a ‘bastard child’. This is only the latest 
of a series of protests against Thai media imperialism and its presumed negative effects on 
Lao culture. Against the edifice of Thai commercial television and radio, the central plank in 
the Lao government’s reform programme seems a trifling thing. In our study of nine rural 
villages in Luang Prabang and Vientiane provinces undertaken in 2001 and 2002, we found a 
very low level of awareness of the New Economic Mechanism (Rigg, 2005). We suspect that 
there was, by comparison, a high level of awareness of political scandals and popular gossip 
in Bangkok. 
 
Reflecting on Lao economic geographies: village and trans-national governmentalities 
 
Even in the hills and among the ethnic minorities of Laos, the market has been brought to 
bear. The world may not have been worn ‘flat’ in Thomas Friedman’s (2005) terms, but it has 
at least been inscribed onto the same page. The point, therefore, is not that some peoples and 
places lie outside the ambit of ‘normal’ explanation, but that their incorporation has been 
unequal. For Laos, this is most profound when it comes to understanding the effects of change 
on the minorities. 
 
To understand and interpret the changes underway in Laos, we need to be intellectually 
flexible. This flexibility lies, to begin with, in where we look, both spatially and in 
disciplinary terms. It has been suggested that the key spaces of interaction in Laos encompass 
an upland/lowland + minority/non-minority interface, a Laos/Thailand interface, and a 
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Laos/GMS interface. These offer the most fruitful routes into an understanding of the 
country’s evolving economic geographies. But to understand how and why these spaces of 
interaction function as they do, it is necessary to look beyond the economic to a series of 
hyphenated economies: the cultural-economy, the social-economy, the political-economy, the 
historical-economy, and the institutional-economy (Table 3).  
 
At the same time, we need to be aware of how we tend to examine Laos’ economic 
geographies. In the main, perspectives are shaped, framed and informed using a Vientiane-
centric viewpoint. This, in turn, is influenced by two sets of forces, one emanating from a 
global debate regarding economic reform and transition, and the other arising from regional 
perspectives linked to embedded historiographies and the evolution of the GMS. It has been 
argued that policies in Laos need to be seen not just as technocratic and managerialist efforts 
informed by a global discourse of development and administration, but equally as products of 
local and regional ‘rationalities’. Thus, in area-based development initiatives we see reflected 
both a set of international agendas linked to issues of access and market integration, and 
domestic concerns and beliefs associated with the proper place of people and activities in Lao 
space. In turn, the domestic debate concerning Laos’ place in the GMS is informed both by 
the attitudes of the funding agencies (particularly the ADB) and by a historically and 
culturally deep historiography linked with Lao-Thai relations. 
 
Returning to the theme of ‘trans-national governmentality’ introduced towards the beginning 
of the paper, Laos certainly seems to fit the explanatory template. The country may not offer a 
particularly rich space for the operation of NGOs (there are no local NGOs), the World Bank, 
ADB, IMF, FAO and other trans-national agencies do play a very significant role indeed. 
Thus the economic geographies – the spatialities of economic activity from subsistence 
shifting cultivation through to patterns of migration – that can be discerned across Laos are 
partially linked to the ideologies, development assumptions and the practical operation of 
such organisations, often in alliance/conjunction with the Lao state. 
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 There is, to be sure, considerable mileage to be gained from thinking of Lao economic 
geographies as outcomes of national and trans-national governmentalities. But this paper has 
also argued that a village-centric perspective – remembering that the great bulk of the 
population of Laos still live in villages – provides an alternative vision that cuts across and 
disturbs these debates and vision. Processes of change in villages in Laos do not necessarily 
contradict the wider national image of marketisation and reform but rather demonstrate how 
geographically contingent this picture is. While ‘village governmentalities’ are not trans-
locally powerful in the  way that state or trans-national organisations and agencies may be, 
they are locally powerfully. So much so, that village-based structures and personalities may 
be ultimately determining. 
 
Just, for the moment, the danger of seeing the bigger picture is that we are then tempted to see 
Asian economic geographies as generic. There are, to be sure, many similarities in the 
discussion above with the experiences of other countries. For example, in terms of 
upland/lowland divisions, minority/non-minority relations, and sedentary/shifting lifestyles. 
But these outcomes, though similar in appearance are different both in essence and in origin, 
for they are linked to a series of spatial associations, scalar disjunctures, historical 
contingencies, and cultural incongruities which are place-based and country or region specific. 
It is for this reason that we need to take the time and care to excavate beneath the economic 




I would like to thank Roy Huijsmans and Henry Yeung for their valuable comments on an 
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comments of the referees; the paper is considerably better as a result. 
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Table 1: The NEM and the Washington consensus 
 
The Washington Consensus Reforms of the NEM 
Fiscal discipline and austerity Fiscal austerity – cuts in public expenditure and monetary 
controls (1999) 
Tax reform Tax reforms introduced (1988); second tax reforms enacted 
(1989) 
Financial liberalisation Fiscal management handed over to the newly-created Central 
Bank of the Lao PDR (1990); reform and restructuring of 
State Commercial Banks (2001) 
Exchange rate reform Multiple exchange rates abolished (1988); New Foreign 
Exchange Decree approved (2002) 
Trade liberalisation Freeing up of market in rice and other staples (1986); 
barriers to cross-provincial and international trade loosened 
(1987); market determination of prices for most commodities 
(1987); removal of final licensing restrictions for imports 
(1993); export and import procedures simplified (2001); 
bilateral trade agreement signed with US (2003); discussions 
with US for extension of normal trade relations (2003) 
Foreign direct investment New investment law (1987); liberalisation of investment 
code (1988); further reforms to investment law (1994) 
Privatisation Private sector involvement in state monopolies permitted 
(1988), privatisation law introduced (1990); accelerated 
privatisation announced (1993) 
Deregulation Banking partially deregulated (1988); first foreign bank 
begins operation (1989); plans for restructuring of five 
largest state-owned enterprises drawn up (2003) 
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Property rights Rights of households to private property acknowledged 
(1988); new laws on contracts and inheritance introduced 
(1990); new land law authorises transfer of land titles to 
relatives and their use as collateral (1997) 
 
Sources: Characteristics of the Washington consensus adapted from Reed and Rosa (n.d. 
[1999]) and Standing (2000). NEM reforms extracted from Rigg, 2005. 
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State categorisation Proportion 











Mon-Khmer Lao Theung (Midland 
Lao) 
56 23.5 2.4 37 
Hmong-Mien Lao Soung (Upland 
Lao) 
15 7.5 2.0 27 
Tibeto-
Burmese 
Lao Soung (Upland 
Lao) 
9 2.5 3.6 17 
Tai-Kadai, 
Tai-Thay 
Lao Loum (Lowland 
Lao) 
13 36.5 0.4 
Tai-Kadai, 
Lao 
Lao Loum (Lowland 
Lao) 
7 30.0 0.2 
73 
Total  100 100 - - 
 
Source: raw data from ADB, 2001a and RTI, 2000 
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Table 3: Laos and its hyphenated economies 
 
Hyphenated economy Laos and its hyphenated economic geographies 
Cultural-economy • Lao versus Thai/Tai culture 
• Role of Thai media imperialism 
• Minority/non-minority relations 
Social-economy • Response of individuals and households to market 
opportunities 
• Operation of the household 
• Traditional versus modern outlooks and norms 
Political-economy • Political rapprochement in mainland Southeast Asia 
• Sensitivities of Lao-Thai relations 
• Role of the ADB and the GMS 
• Nation-building 
Historical-economy • Lao-Thai relations in historical perspective 
• Nation-building 
• Legacy of the colonial period and the war in Indochina 
Institutional-economy • Role of the multilateral institutions (ABD, IMF, World Bank, 
UNDP) 
• Institutional belief in efficacy of market integration 
• Institutional belief in the efficacy of connectivity 
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